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 Introduction: ‘Finance/security’ 
In an agenda-setting piece for the new security studies, Marieke de Goede (2010) 
identifies three ‘avenues’ through which the relations between finance and security might be 
analysed. The traditional remit of International Relations (IR) is said to extend to ‘security 
and finance’, and ‘the instrumental deployment of financial instruments in the service of 
national security and foreign policy’ (p. 101). It is questions of ‘finance and security’, 
meanwhile, which are held to largely preoccupy scholars of International Political Economy 
(IPE), Human Geography and Sociology. For those pursuing this second analytical track, 
what matters are the ways in which ‘financial technologies and profit … premised on the 
provision of security’ actually prove to be ‘causal’ forces producing ‘spectacular insecurity in 
economic life’ (pp. 103-4, original emphasis). Such concerns have, of course, become 
particularly pertinent amidst the violent insecurities wrought by the post-2007 global 
financial crisis (Marrazi, 2010). De Goede’s preferred avenue is ‘finance/security’, however, 
a third route which explicitly explores how the logics, calculations and techniques of finance 
relate to processes of securitisation, that is, to the rendering and governing of social 
phenomena as security problems. What the demarcation of finance/security thus amounts to 
is a call for research, and for the making of further analytical inroads into the thoroughly 
modern and yet contemporaneous coming together of finance and security as philosophies 
and techniques for ‘dealing with the uncertain future’ (de Goede 2010: 106).  
 
When introducing a recent special issue of this journal, Boy, Burgess and Leander (2011) 
similarly draw attention to the interstices of finance/security in the rationalities, practices and 
orderings of contemporary global governance. As they have it, ‘finance and security share a 
claim to universal applicability’ in liberal governance, a claim based largely upon ‘a common 
 vocabulary and epistemology of risk (management)’ (p. 115; cf. Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, van 
Munster, 2008). As Boy, Burgess and Leander also note, moreover, the risk management 
vocabularies and epistemologies of finance/security are dynamic and undergoing a significant 
change at present. Such dynamism is rooted in the creativity, experimentation and remarkable 
fungibility of risk practices that, contrary to Beck’s (1992) insurability thesis, was stressed 
over two decades ago by François Ewald (1991). But contemporary change is also propelled 
by a step-wise intensification of uncertainty, as an increasingly interconnected, volatile and 
eventful world exposes the limit points of the probabilistic calculation and management of 
the future in the present (Amoore, forthcoming). The intersections of finance/security are 
presently witnessing, then, a proliferation of imaginative and anticipatory techniques that 
figure security problems in air travel, terrorism, epidemics and migration, for example (Adey, 
2009; Amoore and de Goede, 2008; Cooper, 2007; Walters, 2006).           
 
Taking the avenue of finance/security, this article makes a three-fold contribution to the 
research which it demands. The first contribution arises from the focus of the article upon the 
United States (US) Treasury’s Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP) of October 2008. 
The TARP was the most high-profile governmental intervention in the global financial crisis 
that broke in August 2007. As the crisis reached its peak in Autumn 2008, it was the difficult 
passage of the US$700 billion TARP through Congress which, more than any other 
individual intervention, appeared to be crucial. Without the TARP’s proposed temporary 
purchase of what were known in popular parlance as ‘toxic assets’ - assets related to and 
derived from repayments on sub-prime mortgages, namely mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) - the complete collapse of global financial 
markets seemed imminent. What is of interest to the analysis of finance/security, however, is 
how this seemingly vital intervention in the crisis forged the problem upon which it sought to 
 act. As will be shown here, the TARP attempted to govern the turbulence not simply as a 
crisis of the financial markets, the banks and of Wall Street, but as one of security. Existing 
forays along the avenue of finance/security typically explore different instances of either the 
financialization of security (e.g. Aitken, 2011; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011; Martin, 2007), or the 
securitization of finance (e.g. de Goede, 2012; Langley, 2008; Martin, 2002). What this 
article will explore is the play of the latter set of processes, as they were manifest in the 
assembly of the TARP and at a moment in which the very insecurities produced by finance 
were stark and evident.  
 
The second contribution made by this article to the analysis of finance/security arises from 
how the TARP will be theorized, in the terms of Michel Foucault (1980; 2007), as a 
‘dispositif’ and ‘apparatus of security’. What will be demonstrated is how the concept of 
security apparatus can hold together analytical concerns with the biopolitical rationality of 
finance/security, on the one hand, and specific and discrete practices of finance/security, on 
the other. Analyses of the interstices of finance/security typically take inspiration from 
Foucault’s (2007, 2008) later work on the biopolitical mode of power. De Goede (2010) 
quotes from Foucault (2007), for instance, to draw out the common rationale of finance and 
security to embrace the opportunities that the uncertain future may afford, at the same time as 
mitigating against the dangers which it may hold. What Boy, Burgess and Leander (2011) 
take from Foucault (2007) and Foucauldian-inspired writings (Dillon, 2007; Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2008), meanwhile, is that the uncertainties which the biopolitical rationality of 
finance/security explicitly targets are the contingencies of circulation. When elaborating upon 
the contemporary securitization of finance in the first section below, then, I concur that the 
governance of the financial crisis has been marked by a rationality of biopolitical security, 
one that seeks to restore and keep open uncertain financial circulations in the name of wealth 
 and well-being in liberal life. But, when proposing to theorize particular crisis governance 
interventions as discrete apparatuses of security, the first section also holds that this 
biopolitical rationality emerges contingently and in processual and lively forms as specific 
orderings are enacted. The second section goes on to illustrate this claim through a detailed 
analysis of the discursive, material and institutional elements that came together, in relation, 
to make the TARP apparatus possible.  
 
Less than two weeks after it was finally approved by Congress, the first tranche of TARP 
monies were spent not on the temporary purchase of toxic assets as originally proposed, but 
to address the problem of bank solvency and capitalisation. The final section below suggests 
that these developments further underline the contingency of biopolitical security and the 
governmental orderings of security apparatuses. But, I also focus on this change in the 
workings of the TARP in order to develop the article’s third contribution to the analysis of 
finance/security. Amidst the tumult of October 2008, the reorientation of the TARP towards 
the problem of bank recapitalisation will be shown to have been a key moment that heralded 
change in the techniques deployed to mitigate the dangers of uncertain global financial 
circulation. During recent decades and prior to the post-2007 crisis, as anticipatory techniques 
came to the fore in the securitisation of liberal life across a number of other domains, the hold 
of probabilistic risk management in the financial domain actually deepened (Partnoy, 2004; 
Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). The turn away from purchasing toxic assets in favour of bank 
recapitalisation by the TARP apparatus will be understood here as, in effect, a moment when 
the limits of probabilistic risk came to the surface and a move towards techniques of 
preparedness and resilience in banking began to take hold.     
 
 Crisis management and the securitization of finance                         
 
There is broad agreement between economists and political economists over how financial 
crisis management is enacted, and about the purpose of crisis management. Crisis 
management is typically understood to entail the actions of the sovereign state, as the so-
called lender of last resort (LOLR), coming to the rescue of the banks, the markets or finance 
capital. In Walter Bagehot’s (1999) much celebrated definition, put forward in his book 
Lombard Street of 1873, the LOLR makes loans available at a penalty rate to essentially 
solvent but illiquid banks in order to prevent them from undermining the market as a whole. 
Similarly, as Charles P. Kindleberger (1996: 146) has it in his classic account of financial 
crises, the LOLR ‘stands ready to halt a run out of real and illiquid financial assets into 
money by making more money available’. Although Kindleberger acknowledges the 
considerable variety in specific last resort lending arrangements in different crises, each 
instance appears in somewhat functional terms as yet another occasion when state institutions 
creatively but reticently respond to a given set of material crisis circumstances in banking 
and/or the markets. Crucial in this respect is the sovereignty of the state as a monetary, 
financial and regulatory agent, and especially the monopoly authorities granted to central 
banks and treasuries in the relational development of nation-states, national currencies and 
fiscal machineries (Gilbert and Helleiner, 1999).  
 
Grounded in wider and long-standing controversies about the proper place of the sovereign 
state in the production and reproduction of monetary relations, much of the debate over 
financial crisis management in liberal economics concentrates on whether the LOLR function 
is indeed necessary and, if it is, whether it serves to distort the operation of market discipline 
by creating so-called ‘moral hazard’. These debates have, for example, led to the questioning 
 of the interventions of the Federal Reserve and US Treasury in the recent crisis (e.g. Taylor, 
2009). For Marxist political economists, meanwhile, debates about ‘moral hazard’ miss the 
point, as the LOLR function of the central bank is held to be a fundamental requirement of 
the reproduction of inherently unstable competitive capitalist banking (Harvey, 1982, 2010). 
Kindleberger’s work is, moreover, broadly representative of a post-Keynesian political 
economy perspective which has proved influential in critical explanations of the present crisis 
(e.g. Nesvetailova, 2010). Here the inherent crisis tendencies of financial markets, rooted in 
what Hyman Minsky (1986) calls the ‘progressive illiquidity’ of ultimately unrealizable 
ownership claims on the future, periodically require the LOLR to restore the ‘public good’ of 
smoothly operating financial markets which serve the ‘real economy’ of production 
(Kindleberger, 1996). In sum, Marxist and post-Keynesian political economy redirect 
analytical attention away from liberal economic debates over ‘moral hazard’, and stress the 
structural significance of last resort lending in mopping-up of the excesses of financial 
competition and circulation. Emphasis nonetheless remains on the somewhat unchanging and 
functional role of the sovereign state as the LOLR to the banks, the markets and finance 
capital. 
 
The assumptions made by economists and political economists about the sovereign state as a 
centralised and instrumental agent of last resort lending sit uncomfortably, however, with an 
increasingly influential body of literature in IR, Political Geography and beyond. Inspired 
primarily by the writings of Michel Foucault and gaining fresh impetus from the recent 
English translation of the lectures he delivered at the Collège de France during the late 1970s 
(Foucault, 2007, 2008), one of the principal motivations of this literature is to explore the 
contemporary rearticulation of the purpose and operation of political sovereignty as a mode 
of power in liberal societies (e.g. Edkins, Pin-Fat and Shapiro, 2004; Elden, 2009; Neal, 
 2004). In Foucault’s (2007) lectures, the period in which sovereign power was the dominant 
modality, a form of territorial, centralised and juridical power relations which ‘consists in 
laying down a law and fixing a punishment for the person who breaks it’ (p. 5), is now past. 
This is not to say that sovereign power has evaporated, far from it. But, sovereignty, for 
Foucault, has become co-present with, and rearticulated by, two further ‘complex edifices’ of 
decentralised power that he identifies (p. 8). Mechanisms of discipline and surveillance, as 
the dominant modality of power from the eighteenth century to the early-to-mid-twentieth 
century, that synchronise and standardise individual bodies through rule-bound enclosures 
(factories, schools, hospitals, prisons, and so forth). And, the ‘contemporary system’ (p. 6), 
developing from the mid-eighteenth century and coming to the fore as disciplinary societies 
have waned, that is characterised by the government of the population at a distance and the 
biopolitical problems of health, wealth and wellbeing (p. 105). Thus, for Foucault (2007; 
2008), the contemporary liberal governmental rationalities of power which address these 
problems are forged through economics as a regime of truth, operate through the technologies 
of circulation, calculation and the entrepreneurialism of ‘free’ individuals, and feature 
contingent apparatus (dispositif) of security that seek to assure the life of the population. 
 
Foucault’s later work clearly did not anticipate the significance that money and finance have 
come to hold for the contemporary governing of liberal life. Yet, as a provocation to think 
anew about the power relations that make the interventions of contemporary financial crisis 
management possible, this work has great prescience and provides insights which are broadly 
three-fold. First, financial crises are now not addressed as strictly financial or indeed banking 
or market problems by the sovereign state, but tend to emerge as problems of ‘security’ in 
liberal government. These are not questions of geopolitical security, but are primarily a 
matter of biopolitical security and of how to ‘make life live’. Put baldly, while the 
 biopolitical rationality has been shown to rework sovereign techniques as it produces a 
financialization of security (e.g. Aitken 2011; Lobo-Guerrero 2011; Martin 2007), monetary, 
fiscal and regulatory sovereignty may well also be remobilized in the securitization of 
finance.  
 
The tendency for financial crises to be biopolitically managed is most pronounced in the USA 
and United Kingdom (UK), where the government of the population has increasingly 
operated through the truths, technologies, circulations and calculations of the financial 
markets in recent decades (Langley, 2008). Transformations in everyday saving and 
borrowing practices in support of individualized welfare – most notably, the rise of stock 
market investment to displace deposit accounts and collective insurance schemes, and the 
ways in which high and unprecedented levels of outstanding mortgage and consumer credit 
become ubiquitous – have been forged through the overlapping and intersecting of previously 
disconnected retail and wholesale financial market networks. Financial dislocations are thus 
more than ever not only wholesale market problems, but problems in the liberal life of the 
population which are especially acute in Anglo-America.  
 
Second, thinking anew in Foucauldian terms, about the biopolitical rationality which is 
present in the crisis governance of contemporary securitized finance, also has methodological 
implications (Collier, 2008; 2009). While it is the case that ‘there is no biopolitics which is 
not simultaneously also a security apparatus’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008: 266), careful 
attention should nonetheless be paid to how that rationality emerges contingently and in 
processual and lively forms as specific orderings are enacted as dispositif. According to 
Rabinow and Rose (2003: xv-xvi), Foucault first used the concept of dispositif to refer ‘in its 
ordinary French usage’ to ‘tools and devices’, thereafter developing it ‘to mean a device 
 orientated to produce something – a machinic contraption whose purpose in this case is 
control and management of certain characteristics of a population’. It is when making this 
latter move, then, that Foucault (1980; 2007; cf. Agamben 2009) departs from a Deleuzean 
(Deleuze 2006) reading of dispositif as a concept which refers, more broadly, to emergent 
assemblages of action or agencements. As Rabinow and Rose (2003: xvi) have it, dispositif 
for Foucault are ‘strategic assemblages … initially formed as responses to crises, problems, 
or perceived challenges’. Such contraptions bring together, in Foucault’s (1980: 194) own 
terms:  
a resolutely heterogeneous grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural 
arrangements, policy decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophic, moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, 
these are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations 
that can be established between these elements.      
The concepts of dispositif and apparatuses of security are, for us, precisely about carefully 
exploring how heterogeneous elements become bound together, in relation, in the strategic 
enactment of distinct biopolitical crisis management interventions. Featuring the relations of 
discursive, institutional and material elements (Aradau, 2010: 493), these interventions each 
attempt to render and govern quite specific problems in the name of financial security, 
including, for example, those of illiquid money markets, mortgage market foreclosures, toxic 
sub-prime assets, excessive risk-taking, the solvency and capitalization of banks and 
sovereign debt (Langley, forthcoming 2014).    
 
The third main insight that Foucault’s later work holds for understandings of financial crisis 
governance relates, moreover, to the common biopolitical rationality that emerges from 
discrete and various apparatuses of security. While strategically rendering and governing 
 crises as a set of particular and technical problems, what marks security dispositif is their 
shared orientation to what Melinda Cooper (2010) calls the ‘turbulence’ of uncertain global 
circulations. For Foucault (2007), while the spatial logics of sovereign and disciplinary 
modes of power operate in terms of state territoriality and the enclosure of docile bodies 
respectively, apparatus of security operate through ‘ensuring circulations: the circulation of 
people, merchandise, and air, etcetera’ (p. 30). That apparatuses of financial crisis 
management should seek in their different ways to get credit money moving again is clearly 
no surprise. However, consider how the post-war planners responded to the Wall Street Crash 
and the Great Depression of the 1930s: the Bretton Woods system of fixed-exchange rates 
and programmes of capital controls and banking regulation largely enclosed financial 
circulations within the national economy, and placed them in the service of production and 
macroeconomic planning (Best, 2005; Helleiner, 1994). Contemporary crisis management 
interventions, in contrast, have actually done relatively little to curtail global financial 
circulations, either by juridical or regulatory means.  
 
That said, the biopolitical rationality that comes into view across the apparatuses of 
contemporary crisis governance has also been characterized by change in the mechanisms 
and techniques through which the destructive consequences of uncertain global finance 
circulations are addressed. In Foucault’s (2007: 20) terms, an apparatus ‘works on the future’ 
such that ‘the management’ of ‘open series’ which ‘can only be controlled by an estimate of 
probabilities’ is ‘pretty much the essential characteristic of the mechanism of security’. It was 
indeed the case that the hold of probabilistic risk management actually deepened in the 
financial domain prior to the post-2007 crisis, as it appeared that the uncertainties of this or 
that asset could be valued, managed, priced and traded accordingly as risks (Partnoy, 2004; 
Millo and MacKenzie, 2009). Although probabilistic risk management has certainly not been 
 jettisoned amidst the struggle to govern the crisis, apparatuses have nonetheless consistently 
confronted the limit points of probabilistic risk and, in doing so, have brought to the fore 
previously nascent anticipatory and imaginative techniques in the securitization of finance 
(Langley, forthcoming 2013).             
 
The TARP apparatus 
 
From its outset in August 2007, and for at least twelve months or so thereafter, the dominant 
diagnosis of the recent turbulence in global financial circulations was that this was a 
‘liquidity crisis’. Such a rendering was common to the media, practitioner and policy 
explanations which sought to begin to make sense of the turmoil, and it animated the initial 
governmental responses of central banks as apparently ‘illiquid markets’ became the object to 
be acted on through so-called ‘liquidity injections’. By late summer 2008, however, it seemed 
that the spectre of illiquidity had not been successfully dealt with, especially in markets for 
what became known in popular parlance as ‘toxic assets’. Related to and derived from sub-
prime mortgages, these instruments continued to appear as the source of massive losses 
which threatened the solvency of many banks and financial institutions. It was the reaction of 
markets to the events of the weekend of 12-14 September 2008 that was nonetheless crucial 
to bringing the TARP forward, a proposed intervention that explicitly targeted toxic assets. 
As Lehman Brothers collapsed to create the largest corporate bankruptcy in US history, and 
as Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America at a fire-sale price after the Federal 
Reserve had siphoned-off Merrill’s toxic assets, fears over the solvency of all manner of 
financial institutions took hold. Banks’ share prices tumbled, putting further pressure on their 
balance sheets and making their insolvency more likely. By 16 September, the Federal 
Reserve apparently had little choice but to deem American International Group (AIG) ‘too 
 big to fail’. The TARP proposals - put before Congress by then Treasury Secretary Henry 
(Hank) Paulson on 19 September and ultimately passed as the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 on 3
 
October - sought to draw a line in the sand amidst the tumult. 
  
Making the crisis actionable as a ‘liquidity crisis’ was a crucial discursive element that gave 
form to the TARP as an apparatus of security. ‘Liquidity’ has many meanings in economic 
theory and practice (Nesvetailova, 2010). But, in the narrow sense that was significant to the 
TARP, liquidity referred to a well-developed market with particular qualitative 
characteristics: a ‘deep’ market in standardized assets which is populated by a crowd of 
willing buyers and sellers who are able to exchange assets without producing significant price 
disruption. Assets in a liquid market thus become regarded as fungible, safe and desirable by 
investors, and are in constant circulation. As the other and constitutive outside of a liquid 
market, an illiquid market is one where buyers are absent and desperate sellers are likely to 
be struggling to exchange toxic assets and to be confronted by wide and volatile spreads 
between the ‘bid’ and ‘ask’ prices.  
 
It was in these terms, then, that the specific problems with sub-prime assets were rendered by 
the TARP, creating a sense in which their illiquidity was abnormal and uncharacteristic of the 
ways in which markets function. In working on and through liquidity and ‘the market’ as ‘a 
site and mechanism for the formation of truth’ (Foucault, 2008: 30), the TARP apparatus cast 
the event of illiquidity as a ‘chimera’ that either ‘cannot exist’ or, when it comes into view, is 
not ‘a natural reality’ but ‘no more than the aberrant result of a number of artificial measures 
that were themselves aberrant’ (Foucault, 2007: 40-1). It was thus highly significant that the 
TARP proposals sought to purchase toxic assets from investors in the expectation that, once 
the seemingly peculiar moment of illiquidity had passed, they could be once again be sold 
 into a liquid market. In the terms of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke (2008), the 
purchase of toxic assets by the Treasury and their subsequent re-sale would enable ‘price 
discovery’, encouraging investors to return to these asset markets and, ultimately, restoring 
flows of mortgage lending and financial circulations more broadly. 
 
As the TARP rendered the crisis as moment when the market norm of liquidity had been lost, 
a wide array of models, techniques and organisational strategies which had held sway in 
financial markets from the mid-1990s were also important elements in the apparatus. Liquid 
markets became objectified during the run up to the crisis, a known thing or object that was 
regarded by investors as independent and external to them, as having a ‘life of their own’ in 
setting and moving prices, facilitating exchange, managing risk and so on. Indeed, the 
reification of liquid markets had been present in sub-prime market networks which seemed to 
exemplify what was possible during the boom. For example, on the lending side, sub-prime 
epitomised what was known as the ‘originate and distribute’ model which was being 
championed in commercial banking. For banks and sub-prime non-banks alike, apparently 
liquid markets made it possible to originate new assets (e.g. mortgages, loans, credit card 
balances) and to move them ‘off-balance sheet’ and into circulation by securitising and 
repackaging them as risk instruments purchased and exchanged by investors. Meanwhile, on 
the investment side, those with a stake in sub-prime assets could enact highly-leveraged 
strategies, apparently safe in the knowledge that, in liquid markets, they could easily roll-over 
their short-term borrowing or sell the assets that they held. Not only was the proprietary 
trading of Wall Street’s investment banks highly-leveraged through the perpetual roll-over of 
increasingly short-term debt, for instance. Their so-called ‘prime brokerage’ businesses lent 
in support of the similarly highly-leveraged strategies of hedge funds, and became involved 
with banks of all kinds in the off-balance sheet ‘liquidity leverage’ of structured investment 
 vehicles (SIVs) (The Economist, 2008a: 4). As a key part of the ‘shadow banking sector’, 
SIVs sought to take advantage of interest rate arbitrage, borrowing short-term ‘surplus 
liquidity’ in asset-backed commercial paper markets and investing for the ‘enhanced yield’ 
that was apparently on offer from MBS and especially structured CDOs.  
 
When ‘announcing the crisis’ (Foucault, 2007: 61), and forging illiquid and toxic asset 
markets not merely as a problem but as the object to be acted on, relations with several 
further material devices were also significant to the TARP apparatus. Bank balance sheets 
and credit default swap (CDS) contracts were, in particular, crucial to creating the ‘material 
givens’ (Foucault, 2007: 19) through which and on which the TARP apparatus was to 
operate. To be clear, these calculative devices did not simply describe and classify the 
turbulence in global circulations. Rather, by providing measures of the decline in the value of 
toxic assets in the present through probabilistic and predictive calculations of the future, these 
devices necessarily contributed to the terms through which the crisis itself came to be 
understood and acted upon by the TARP.  
 
It was on balance sheets where the declining values of the sub-prime assets were literally 
‘booked’ or ‘written-down’, an accounting move whereby these assets were re-valued to a 
certain amount in the dollar. And, by virtue of the balance sheet as a device that sets assets 
against liabilities (including deposits and short- and long-term debt), this also meant that 
capital was set-aside on the liabilities side to absorb losses. At the point at which the TARP 
proposals came before Congress, investors were widely known to have made a cumulative 
total of US$500 billion in write-downs on sub-prime assets since September 2007 (Tett, 
2008). When contributing to establishing the material givens upon which the TARP apparatus 
was to act, CDS contracts were also a crucial element in two main respects. First, in writing-
 down and revaluing specific sub-prime assets on their balance sheets, investors’ calculations 
included the extent to which their losses were covered (hedged) by CDS contracts on those 
assets. CDS are ‘over-the-counter’ or bespoke derivative contracts written and sold by 
institutions that seek a stake in the risk/return characteristics of specific underlying debt 
instruments, without investing in the instruments themselves. Immediately prior to the TARP 
proposal coming before Congress, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, a major dealer in CDS, 
had created further trepidation about the value of sub-prime assets (The Economist, 2008b). 
Moreover, when the Fed extended AIG an US$85 billion loan, it had sought to make it 
possible for the insurer to make good on the payouts arising from credit events in the US$450 
billion worth of CDS that it had written and sold (Felsted and Burgess, 2008). The extent of 
the material givens of illiquid sub-prime assets was, then, inextricably bound up whether the 
CDS market would hold up. Second, premiums for CDS contracts were also a significant 
measure of the apparent illiquidity of sub-prime assets (Tett, 2009). A spike in the price for 
CDS contracts written against bonds issued by a particular financial institution were 
commonly taken as an indication that it may not have sufficient capital to cover it losses from 
assets that had gone toxic (Larsen and Scholtes, 2008). More directly and in terms of 
contracts written on sub-prime CDOs themselves, rising CDS premiums were taken as an 
indication of the illiquidity and declining value of the underlying instruments.  
 
For the TARP apparatus, then, it was the resonance between prevailing economic theories of 
liquid markets, financial market models and strategies, and the calculations of bank balance 
sheets and CDS contracts that, taken together, rendered the crisis as a problem of illiquidity 
and toxicity. Relations with further discursive and institutional elements were vital, 
moreover, to the ways in which the TARP appeared to hold out a solution to that problem. 
The TARP did not seek to respond to the grinding halt in markets by taking toxic assets into a 
 ‘bad bank’ and out of circulation once and for all, or by closing down markets for MBS and 
CDOs. This juridical and disciplinary response could conceivably have restored the general 
circulations of financial markets, but it was not the course of action that was charted. Instead, 
in Foucault’s (2007: 65) terms, the seeming solution to the problem of illiquidity turned on 
‘sifting the good from the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement … but in such a 
way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out’. 
 
The TARP was enacted through the relation of elements which explicitly positioned the 
attempt to restore liquidity in sub-prime asset markets as crucial to individual freedom and 
the liberal way of life. Now, money in circulation is crucial to the individualism of modern 
society: the loosening of social ties enabled by the holding of money appears to enlarge the 
scope of individual freedom by making all things and desires available at a price (Simmel, 
1990). But, the TARP apparatus also featured a discursive element that iteratively worked on 
the associations of money and freedom by melding the restoration of the liquid circulation of 
sub-prime assets with the future individual and collective life prospects of the population. 
There was, in short, an explicit acknowledgement that illiquidity in wholesale markets 
threatened the freedom and security enabled by mortgage finance, credit money and retail 
finance in general.  
 
Particularly illustrative in this respect is the televised address to the nation delivered by 
President George W. Bush (2008) during the period in which the TARP proposals were 
before Congress. As Bush put it, ‘This rescue effort is not aimed at preserving any individual 
company or industry. It is aimed at preserving America’s overall economy’. With this in 
mind, he set out what the possible costs of inaction could be for the security of the 
population: 
  
… without immediate action by Congress, America could slip into a financial panic and 
a distressing scenario would unfold. More banks could fail … The stock market would 
drop even more, which would reduce the value of your retirement account. The value of 
your home could plummet … Even if you have good credit history, it would be more 
difficult for you to get the loans you need to buy a car or send your children to college.   
 
Bush’s televised address left viewers in little doubt that toxic assets were a problem for the 
American way of life, and that the TARP provided the solution that would successfully act on 
that problem by restoring circulation. As he later put it, following the initial rejection of the 
TARP proposals by the House of Representatives, action was needed ‘for the financial 
security of every American’ (in Politi, 2008).  
 
Such a biopolitical rationality resonated strongly with an apparent solution to the crisis that 
turned not on a central banking intervention by the Federal Reserve, but on the institution of 
the U.S Treasury. While the remit of the Federal Reserve system extends to monetary policy, 
banking regulation, maintaining the payments system and ensuring financial market stability, 
the Treasury’s fiscal responsibilities and stewardship of the growth and stability of the 
national economy are explicitly undertaken in the name of the population. It was on the basis 
of this authorisation which dates to the end of the eighteenth-century, and the associated and 
unique capacity that it bestows to the Treasury in the issue of US government debt 
instruments (‘T-bonds’), that it was the principal institutional element in the forging of the 
security apparatus of the TARP. In order that toxic assets could be purchased and temporarily 
taken out of circulation by the Treasury, however, they had to be valued and priced. The 
proposed sifting mechanism for cancelling out illiquidity and making toxic assets knowable 
 and actionable, and thus a significant further institutional element in the forging of the TARP 
apparatus, was to be a reverse auction process conducted by the Treasury. It was envisaged 
that the Treasury would offer to buy certain classes of toxic assets at a particular price, and 
investors would decide whether to sell at that price. The decisive issue was whether it was 
indeed possible to assign values and prices to toxic assets, whether the authority of the 
Treasury could do what markets had been unable to do for the previous year.  
 
From toxic assets to bank recapitalisation 
 
The reverse auction process arguably went right to the heart, then, of the TARP as a security 
apparatus which sought to restore market liquidity and financial circulations by working on 
the future through the rubric of risk. It was only through probabilistic risk calculations that 
valuations, and thus the prices which symbolise those valuations, could be arrived at for the 
particular toxic assets to be purchased by the Treasury’s reverse auction process. Amidst the 
on-going and extreme market turbulence of late September and early October 2008, however, 
questions as to whether it was possible to value and price toxic assets fed into a wider debates 
about the most appropriate form that governmental interventions in the crisis should take. 
High-profile economists and financial journalists who either doubted the potential efficacy of 
an intervention that targeted toxic assets from the outset, or who felt once the TARP 
legislation had been passed that the valuation and pricing of toxic assets became 
impracticable, stressed that it was on the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets where action 
to directly recapitalise institutions could be most successful (e.g. Krugman, 2008; Soros, 
2008; Stiglitz, 2008; Wolf, 2008). And, the Bush administration and Treasury officials were 
far from immune to the alternative recapitalisation argument, especially given the seeming 
urgency of the situation (Paulson, 2010).  
  
Bank recapitalisation was precisely the type of crisis management intervention that was 
underway elsewhere during early October, most notably in the UK where the crisis had 
increasingly been rendered as a crisis of bank solvency that required a ‘bank bailout’. Half of 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s £500 billion emergency financial rescue package was 
earmarked to guarantee bank’s short and medium term wholesale debt obligations, but it also 
purchased preference shares worth £37 billion in two struggling banks (RBS and Lloyds 
TSB). Further and similar equity stakes in these banks worth £39 billion were purchased in 
the following month. Indeed, it was Brown’s crisis management solution of direct bank 
recapitalisation that was embraced by a meeting of the Group of 7 (G-7) finance ministers 
and central bankers in Washington on 10 October (G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, 2008). As such, and in his statement released following the meeting, US Treasury 
Secretary Paulson (2008) continued not rule out ‘the approach we are taking to broad 
mortgage asset purchases’, but also set out the bare bones of ‘plans to purchase equity … on a 
non-voting basis’. Critical in making these revised plans possible was an aspect of the 
legislative element of the TARP apparatus which enshrined the authorisation of the Treasury, 
and which gave the Treasury Secretary ‘discretion … to purchase other assets, as deemed 
necessary to effectively stabilize financial markets’ (US Treasury Department, 2008).  
 
As of 14 October, less than two weeks after the TARP had passed into law, it was announced 
that the first US$250 billion of its funds would be used by the new Capital Purchase Program 
to recapitalise US banks through the purchase of preference shares. Half of this funding was 
to be invested in the nine largest US banks, which now included the remaining former 
investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley who had changed their legal status to 
bank holding companies during the turbulence. Under the terms of the recapitalisation that 
 came to embrace over 200 institutions in total, banks which were deemed by regulators to 
require investment could not turn it down. The purchase of illiquid sub-prime assets by US 
Treasury through the TARP apparatus was officially abandoned in mid-November 2008, and 
US$40 billion of TARP monies was invested in AIG in the same month and US$25 billion in 
automakers and their financial arms in December. That said, November 2008 did see TARP 
monies set aside to contribute to public guarantees on the value of toxic assets purchased by 
so-called ‘vulture investors’ from the books of Citigroup, an insurance-style approach to the 
ongoing problem of illiquid assets which was repeated for Bank of America in January 2009 
and with limited success in the Obama administration’s Public-Private Investment Program 
(P-PIP) of March 2009. The broad reorientation of the TARP apparatus to bank solvency as 
the object to be acted on through recapitalisation remained, however, as Congress granted the 
release of the second half of the TARP monies in January 2009 and thereafter throughout the 
first years of the Obama administration. By the end of the summer of 2009, and following a 
celebrated programme of ‘stress testing’ that measured bank’s preparedness for imagined 
future macroeconomic scenarios, all but the most troubled banks began buying back their 
shares and repaying the TARP monies (Langley, forthcoming 2013). At the end of the 
financial year 2010-11, the TARP held only US$30 billion worth of bank preference shares 
on which the Congressional Oversight Board (2011: 177) expected eventual losses to be 
‘relatively small’.  
 
The trials, tribulations and dynamism of the TARP can thus be seen to underline the 
contingency of biopolitical security and the governmental orderings of apparatuses which 
seek to keep uncertain global financial circulations in motion in times of crisis. That the 
TARP did not conform to its conceived purpose was not all that surprising. It was, after all, a 
fragile bricolage of heterogeneous elements that urgently came together. As Rabinow and 
 Rose (2003: xvii) put it, ‘despite the initial intention that an apparatus will respond in a 
targeted way to a particular problem to achieve a specific strategic objective, diverse and 
unplanned effects can and do result’. More broadly, and as Deleuze’s (2006) reading of 
Foucault’s concept of dispositif suggests, that which an apparatus seeks to act upon in the 
name of the biopolitical security always, to a greater or lesser extent, escapes its ordering 
intervention.  
 
Yet, the unplanned reorientation of the TARP apparatus from the temporary purchase of toxic 
assets to the direct recapitalisation of US banks can also be seen as a key moment which 
heralded change in the techniques deployed to mitigate the dangers of uncertain global 
financial circulation. That the TARP ultimately configured bank solvency as the object to be 
acted on through direct recapitalisation was not, to be clear, a move away from the ‘option of 
circulation’ that Foucault (2007: 49) identifies as one of the defining characteristics of 
apparatuses of security. With the transformation of the TARP, the biopolitical security 
dilemma in the crisis was no longer primarily one of reviving circulation in sub-prime assets 
and secondary mortgage markets more widely, but of how best to get solvent and stabilized 
banks lending once again. For example, as Congress considered whether to release the second 
US$350 billion of TARP monies in January 2009, the Congressional Oversight Panel (2009a) 
was highly critical of the way in which the initial purchase of preference shares in banks had 
not been combined with accountability mechanisms that would have required lending to 
consumers and businesses. Not dissimilarly, when the Obama administration undertook its 
program of stress testing in Spring of 2009 in order to determine which of the largest 19 US 
banks required further recapitalisation through the TARP, the Treasury emphasised that the 
objective of the program was to ensure that creditworthy borrowers would continue to be able 
to get access to finance ‘in the event of a weaker-than-expected economic environment and 
 larger-than-estimated losses’ (Congressional Oversight Panel, 2009b: 3). And, when banks 
were permitted during the latter half of 2009 to repay the TARP monies that they had 
received by way of recapitalisation, they were cast as materially capable of producing the 
flows of credit crucial to the freedom and security of the liberal way of life. 
 
At stake as the TARP directly recapitalised US banks was, in effect, the beginnings of a 
subtle shift in the primary means through which the destructive potential of the uncertainties 
of global financial circulations were to be alleviated. From the mid-1990s and persisting as 
the TARP was initially forged as an apparatus that would sift bad assets, the predominant 
‘mechanism of mitigation’ (Collier, 2008) for assuaging the dangers of global financial 
circulation was supposed to operate through the pricing and distribution of ‘risks’ amongst 
investors in liquid markets. This means of probabilistic risk management was performed in 
banking organizations through value-at-risk (VaR) models which, emerging from the wake of 
the 1987 stock market crash, put a number on the amount a bank could expect to lose on its 
portfolio of assets on a relatively bad day. It had also been thoroughly legitimated by the 
1997 revision to the Bank of International Settlement’s Basel capital adequacy standards that, 
while making provisions for a whole host of risks, notably did not include codes of conduct 
for dealing with ‘liquidity risk’ (Nesvetailova, 2007). Related, techniques of asset-backed 
securitisation and structured finance had ensured that default risks arising from mortgages 
and all manner of loans were moved off bank’s balance sheets, and were sliced, diced, priced 
and traded by investors (Partnoy, 2004). And, while rapidly growing ‘over-the-counter’ 
markets for credit derivatives promised prior to the crisis that the default risks of specific 
assets (e.g. a corporate bond) could be hedged through bespoke contracts, they also served to 
enable trading in volatility and variance which was marked by its indifference to the 
performance of underlying assets (Wigan, 2009).  
  
So, as the TARP came to operate to purchase preference shares and directly recapitalise 
banks, change began to take hold in the primary mechanism for mitigation in the governing 
of global financial circulations. The TARP was the beginning of a move away from reliance 
on the probabilistic pricing and distribution of risks through markets, and from the logic of 
preemption which, as Louise Amoore (2011) argues, is promoted by the arraying of a range 
of possible futures in derivatives markets. Like all recapitalisation drives in contemporary 
crisis management and subsequent regulatory attempts to improve the so-called ‘resilience’ 
of banks, the TARP effectively sought to invigorate preparedness as a mechanism for dealing 
with the dangers of the uncertain financial future. As Ben Anderson (2010) has it with 
reference to a wide range of techniques that govern liberal life through risk and uncertainty, 
‘preparedness’ can be distinguished from mechanisms of ‘precaution’ and ‘preemption’. As 
he describes these mechanisms or ‘logics’: 
 
both precaution and preemption aim to stop the occurrence of a future, by either 
stopping a process before it reaches a point of irreversibility or initiating a new process. 
Preparedness is different. Its sphere of operation is a series of events after a 
precipitating event. Unlike precaution or preemption, preparedness does not aim to stop 
a future event happening. Rather, intervention aims to stop the effects of an event 
disrupting the circulations and interdependencies that make up a valued life (p. 791).  
 
The TARP did not seek to make a future of bank insolvency actionable in the present by 
simply reverting to the kinds of precautionary mechanisms that prevailed before probabilistic 
financial risk management practices took hold. So, although the TARP sought to boost the 
volume of capital that banks held, it did not signal a return to the Basel I rules of the late 
1980s wherein closely monitored holdings of capital set absolute limits upon a relatively 
 static set of assets on bank balance sheets. Rather, and as it was developed further in the 
Spring of 2009 to incorporate the techniques of stress testing in particular, the future dangers 
that the TARP sought to prepare recapitalised U.S. banks for were not those which were 
calculated and priced as probable and based on induction from past events, but those that, for 
the high-impact, low-probability events especially, were quite unprecedented historically.  
 
Conclusions 
 
With specific reference to the US Treasury’s crucial TARP initiative in the governance of the 
recent financial crisis, this article has added to the growing body of research concerned with 
how the logics, calculations and techniques of finance relate to processes of securitisation. 
Inquiry into the interstices of finance/security has to date erred somewhat towards the 
financialization of security, exploring the ways in which risk markets, insurance and 
derivatives, for example, enter into the securitization of the uncertain future in the present 
(Aitken, 2011; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011; Martin, 2007). But, finance itself is also securitized in a 
range of different ways, rendered and governed as problem of security in the war on terror, 
for instance (de Goede 2012), and in terms of providing for wealth and well-being in 
individualized liberal life more broadly (Langley, 2008; Martin, 2002). What this article has 
shown, in the first instance, is how the TARP acted on the crisis not simply as a crisis of the 
financial markets, the banks and of Wall Street. Contrary to the common sense produced 
through accounts of financial crisis governance in economics and political economy, the 
TARP was an intervention made in the name of the problem of the security of the American 
population. 
 
 The later writings of Michel Foucault have been crucial to the analysis that has been offered 
throughout this article. Foucault’s work has, in broad terms, provided the insights through 
which the securitization of finance has been understood to turn on a biopolitical rationality, 
wherein the truths, technologies, calculations and circulations of financial markets have 
become pivotal to the contemporary individualized security of the population. This a 
modality of power which, in liberal governmental responses to the turbulence and insecurities 
of financial crises, also reworks the techniques and institutions of monetary, fiscal and 
regulatory sovereignty. The contemporary crisis governance of finance, forged in the name of 
the problem of biopolitical security, thus does not witness significant attempts to rule-out or 
regulate-away the uncertain future of financial circulations. There is, in short, no attempt to 
crisis-proof finance. Instead, biopolitical crisis governance is ambiguous in its relation to 
uncertain financial circulations: one the one hand, it seeks to restore and keep open the 
opportunities that these circulations apparently afford for the wealth and well-being of the 
population; on the other hand, it seeks to find new ways to sort and address the dangers that 
these circulations undoubtedly hold for liberal life. 
 
Moreover, and specifically, this article has drawn on Foucault’s (1980; 2007) concepts of 
‘dispositif’ and ‘apparatuses of security’ in order to make two further contributions to the 
analysis of the interstices of finance/security. First, and as elaborated through my detailed 
account of the TARP as a discrete security apparatus, it has been demonstrated how this 
concept can facilitate analytical concerns with both the operation of a biopolitical rationality 
of power and the specific practices of finance/security. Rather than produced by an already 
present and all-encompassing modality of power relations, biopolitical security takes 
contingent, processual and lively forms as discrete governmental orderings are enacted. As 
such, the TARP apparatus certainly amounted to a biopolitical intervention in the crisis, but it 
 only emerged from the relation between the discursive, material and institutional elements 
which made it possible. Second, and related, while the transformation of the TARP into an 
apparatus that acted on the problem bank solvency and capitalisation has been analysed here 
to further illustrate the contingency of biopolitical security, it has also been shown to have 
been, in effect, a key moment that heralded change in the mitigation mechanisms than seek to 
diffuse the dangers of uncertain global financial circulations. Foucauldian-inspired accounts 
of how liberal life is governed through risk and uncertainty tend to stress the contemporary 
proliferation of imaginative and anticipatory techniques. This was, however, certainly not the 
case in financial governance prior to the post-2007 crisis. And, as has been argued here, these 
techniques have only gained significant traction in the financial domain after the TARP’s 
contingent transformation, after its reverse auction process was confronted by the limit points 
of probabilistic risk and thereby failed to respond to the turbulence through the temporary 
purchase of toxic assets.                    
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